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1. Introduction
Economic theory suggests that firms seek to maximise their profits; however
literature on profit maximisation has not distinguished between ‘pre-tax profit’ and
‘after-tax profit’. This distinction is important for policy analysis. If it is taken that
firms reduce their costs to maximise their pre-tax profits, then one would expect
them to pay due share of taxes and tax revenues would be relatively predictable.
However it is reasonable to suppose that in the pursuit of maximising after-tax
profits, firms will deploy strategies to reduce their corporate tax liabilities. Tax
avoidance (taking advantage of the provisions of tax laws), tunnelling (transferring
resources from one firm to another), and transfer pricing, are pervasive, especially
amongst large firms and tax authorities find is difficult to tackle these.
Accordingly, profits of the firms are difficult to predict and, as a corollary, hard to
forecast. Underestimation of revenues can lead to serious problems during the
course of the budget year if governments are forced to bring down expenditures in
line with revenues; overestimation can result in taxpayer cynicism about the entire
budget process and in government employee anger over contract negotiations
(Rogers and Joyce, 1996).
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2Within the context of a principle-agent framework, where the tax authority is
principal and taxpaying firms are agents, this paper introduces a model of
corporate taxes which shows that agent firms exploit complete information
embodied in provisions of tax statutes and the tax policy. While the principal can
observe some of the actions of the agents, it may be powerless in taking remedial
actions because of legitimacy of the actions.  The process of reducing tax liabilities
by taxpayers taking advantage of loopholes in tax laws and special provisions is
called ‘tax sheltering’ (Cowell, 1990). Certain actions of agents, such as tunnelling,
are hidden from the principal or otherwise costly to investigate, and therefore the
principal has less information as compared with the agents. Scholes and Wolfson
(1992) provide a cogent discussion of the difficulties tax authorities face in
identifying financial innovation and the dilemma of how to resolve them.
Consequently, firms find ways to achieve their after-tax profit maximization
objective.
Several approaches to corporate tax modelling co-exist, each with their own
strengths, limitations, and potential role in policy analysis. Depending on the
objectives of the policy analysis, tax modelling could follow either a micro or
macro approach. The main use of tax models in the area of corporate taxation is for
revenue estimating and forecasting. “Revenue estimating” is the process of
assessing the impact of tax law changes proposed at the time of the budget or
subsequently. In the UK, the same process is commonly referred to as “tax costing”
(King, 1995). This is closely related to revenue forecasting but is different from it.
Forecasts are needed even when no change of the tax law is envisaged, while
revenue estimates must often be made for proposals that are not subsequently
adopted (King, 1995).  Since the late 1960s, the major OECD economies, and
individual states within the USA, have developed microsimulation models for their
major taxes, particularly on personal and corporate incomes1. These models are
constructed from samples of tax return data. Their focus is on the detailed
application of tax law to the structure of the tax base, at the level of individual
taxpayer liabilities. In most cases the primary purpose of these models has been to
assist in revenue estimating.
                                                          
1
 
Spahn and Pearson (1998) examine tax models in transition economies. For a review of models
in the USA, see Rubin, Peters and Nantell (1999).
3Revenue estimation is not without problems. King (1986, 1995) highlights
problems that arise in summarising tax changes in a single number. First, a
particular change to the tax law can generally be expected to have revenue effects
that occur over time. Second, a change to one tax will often affect revenues from
other taxes. Thirdly, behavioural effects may need to be captured.
Alongside revenue estimation, in many countries (for example, the UK and
France) microsimulation models are also used for revenue forecasting. Forecasts of
government revenues from different taxes are produced to serve a variety of
purposes, most importantly, government budgeting.  A forecast of total revenues is
useful to estimate the deficit that will have to be financed. In the UK, at the heart
of such forecasting process is the microsimulation model, developed internally by
the Inland Revenue (IR), which exploits the macroeconomic forecasts supplied by
the Treasury (see Eason (2000), Eason (1996), Eason and Elmore (1998) and Orme
and Mellor (1999) for a detailed account of the model)2. However, despite its long
history and steady improvement, the IR model cannot simulate some aspects of the
future tax position of the companies accurately (Orme and Mellor, 1999). This is
partly due to the heterogeneity (in terms of types, size, age, business activity,
corporate financial policy, structures) of firms, volatility of annual profits or losses
of companies, skewness of distribution of tax payments, and partly due to some
limitations of the methods employed. Because forecasts are produced within a
climate of uncertainty and changing economic conditions, the microsimulation
models find it hard to cope with these factors and there is always the possibility of
making an error. Moreover, with microsimulation models it is generally difficult to
infer behavioural responses to changes in tax policy. Grizzle and Earle (1994)
argue that combining forecasting methods could result in more accurate forecasts.
A number of methodologies for revenue forecasting co-exist with structural
microsimulation models; including those conditional on macroeconomic variables,
such as GDP, and those that are made unconditionally. See appendix A for a brief
discussion of such methodologies.
This paper finds its motivation from the UK experience of microsimulation
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In the UK non-government models include those of the Institute for Fiscal Studies which enable
comparisons of forward looking marginal tax rates for the EU (Devereux and Griffith, 2002) and
the Manchester Business School (MBS). The MBS tax models developed by Chittenden et al.
(2001) measure the tax burden borne by SMEs and the impact on the growth of such businesses.
4modeling of corporate taxes and aims to identify the significant determinants of tax
liabilities that must be taken into account for more accurate tax estimation and
forecasting. Considering the behavioural aspects of corporate tax modeling, this
paper introduces a microeconometric approach that aims to provide an insight into
the tax behaviour of firms and examine factors which impact on corporate tax
liabilities.
Since microsimulation models of firms are constructed from samples of tax
returns data, which are protected by privacy laws, the literature on corporate
taxation has been limited to examining the impact of tax policies and effective tax
rates (ETRs) in different countries on firms’ investment decisions and their choices
regarding ownership structure, debt/equity, and dividend payouts. The ETR
approaches use hypothetical data to compute the cost of user capital for deciding
on investments and are useful in multi-country analysis of tax burdens. Some
portion of the literature has also examined the impact of taxation on income
shifting/transfer pricing behaviour of companies.
For the most part, however, the existing literature does not examine the
endogeneity of tax liabilities and the causation that runs from firms’ economic
decisions to their tax liabilities. Econometric analysis that establishes the link
between the commercial factors at the level of the firm and the taxes paid is also
non-existent in the literature. The micro level analytical framework introduced in
this paper aims to fill this gap and is an important contribution in this area. The
econometric approach used in the paper exposes the commercial factors and firms’
rational decisions which potentially affect their tax liabilities. These factors cannot
be captured by existing microsimulation models of corporate taxes. The
econometric model of the determinants of corporate tax liabilities, using actual
micro (firm level) data is a new framework. Tax behaviour of companies,
especially the large ones, poses a great challenge to corporate tax modelling and no
econometric study has previously examined the behavioural factors impacting on
taxes paid by the firms.
Considering that trading profits and capital gains, which together make up
taxable profits, are coarse determinants of corporation tax, the present study
examines each component of accounting profits with respect to its impact in
determining corporate tax liabilities of the firms. Besides the main variables
(operating profits and capital gains), gross profit, cost of sales, management
5expenses and even one-off transactions such as exceptional items and extraordinary
items also affect corporation tax liabilities individually. These should be useful in
understanding the tax behaviour of companies. Moreover, the variables reflecting a
company’s profile such as age, size, number of subsidiaries and holdings, asset
structure, liabilities, dividend policy, working capital and investments in capital
assets are also considered relevant to the determination of corporate tax liabilities.
Additionally, the provisions in tax codes allowing tax reliefs, credits and
deductions influence tax behaviour of a company. Therefore, the role of tax reliefs
in the corporation tax payments also forms a part of the study.  The explanatory
model presented in the paper accentuates the potential loss of tax revenue due to
firms’ manipulations within subsidiaries and holdings by way of transfer pricing,
income shifting, intra-group activities and artificial loans, which are labelled as
‘tunnelling’ in the recent literature (see, for instance, Bertrand, Mehta and
Mullainathan, 2000). The model is estimated using firm level panel data of UK
companies in three diverse sectors (hotels and restaurants, business services and
transport). Given publicly available comparable dataset, the model provides a
framework for international comparisons as well.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents an analysis of the UK
corporate tax system to provide an overview of the tax environment in which the
UK businesses operate. Section 3 presents a brief review of literature on studies
that examine the effect of corporate taxation on factors, such as, investment,
corporate financial decisions, and income shifting / tunnelling. Section 4 presents a
new framework and develops an econometric model to investigate the
determinants of tax liabilities. Section 5 describes the data on the variables used in
the model and their relative significance. Section 6 reports the econometric results
and their implication for tax modelling, while section 7 concludes.
2. The UK corporation tax system: an analysis
UK Corporation tax  (CT) is charged on the trading profit and capital gains
of a company earned in each accounting period (AP) - normally a twelve months
period chosen by the company. There are a number of factors that render the
calculation of tax liabilities a non-trivial exercise. Companies are allowed to
deduct various costs. In addition, ‘capital allowances’ provide relief for the
6consumption or depreciation of capital assets. Different types of assets attract
different allowances. The trading loss or any capital loss can be adjusted in the
same year and/or carried forward indefinitely or carried back to the previous
accounting period. The dividends received from another company in the UK are
exempt from corporate tax.  A company that makes trading loss can surrender that
loss as group relief to set against the profits of an equivalent accounting period of
another group member. Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) are allowed
Research and Development tax credits. Until April 1999 corporate income tax was
paid in two parts. Advance Corporation Tax (ACT) was paid at the time of
dividend payment with the tax amount determined by the size of dividend.
Mainstream corporation tax (MCT) was paid nine months after the end of the
accounting period. The MCT is calculated by deducting Advance Corporation Tax
(ACT) already paid from the total tax liability. However, ACT was to be set off
subject to certain rules limiting how much it could be carried back or forward to
preceding or following years.  In 1999 ACT was abolished and replaced by a new
system of quarterly instalment payments for the larger companies. Under the new
system, half of a company’s tax liability would be paid in year and the remaining
half paid within four months of the end of the accounting period. These changes
were aimed at simplifying payment arrangements and removing the complexities
of surplus ACT.
Corporation tax in the UK accounts for 10 percent of the total revenue and
almost 4 per cent of the GDP. However, the annual yield is highly volatile and
difficult to forecast accurately which is problematic since fiscal planning by the
government requires somewhat accurate revenue forecasts.  The forecast errors are
attributable partly to the heterogeneity (in terms of types, size, age, business
activity, corporate financial policy, structures) of firms, volatility of annual profits
or losses of companies, skewness of the distribution of tax payments, and
limitations of forecasting methodologies.  The largest companies pay a major
chunk of the corporate tax revenue. In 1998/99 just 12 companies paid 10 per cent
of MCT receipts, some 10 per cent of all corporate tax payers accounted for 85%
of the MCT receipts and 20 per cent of all CT paying companies accounted for 97
per cent of MCT revenue (Orme and Mellor, 1999). More recent trends are even
more striking. According to Inland Revenue (Yeend, 2002), around a quarter of the
largest corporations pay no tax at all. On the other hand, the top 10 CT payers
7alone pay around 25% of all CT and the top 50 around 50% of the corporate tax
revenue. This makes it crucial to fully understand a relatively small number of
Business Groups to model the impact of tax policies (Yeend, 2002). During the
year 2000/2001, out of total 502,101 companies actually paying some corporate
tax, just 2982 companies paid £23,462 million, which is 74% of total CT payments
of £31,729 million.  Only 740 companies paid £18,765 million of corporation tax,
which makes 59% of the total corporate tax revenue (Inland Revenue, 2002).
Appendix ‘B’ shows the number, income, allowances, deductions and
corporate tax liabilities by industrial sectors according to SIC 1992 classifications
for the year 2000-2001. The highest income earning sectors is energy and water
supply where just 2,371 cases yielded a gross profit of £24,648 million, and per
case average trading profits were £10.396 million. However, the four biggest
earning sectors (energy, water supply; overseas activities; banking and finance;
extraction, metal manufacturing, chemical) also consumed the highest per case
capital allowances and deductions reducing their tax liabilities considerably. It is
interesting to see that the total capital allowances for the year stood at £67,382
million which were 36 per cent of the gross trading profits and 160 per cent of the
total chargeable corporate income tax for the period. It must be recognized that
these capital allowances give considerable relief to high-tech and capital-intensive
industries for economic depreciation of their capital assets. Labour-intensive
industries are less leveraged in such relief. It is no surprise that construction,
business services, other services, hotels and catering, and distribution and repairs,
which account for the largest number (498,771 or 71%) of UK corporate taxpayers
earning some trading profit or other income during 2000-01 (698,183), only get
30% of total allowances and minimum average per case benefits on capital
allowances. Likewise, deductions on account of interest expenses are restricted to
those companies that finance their business through borrowed capital. Companies
investing their retained earnings do not get a corresponding allowance for
corporate equity (the opportunity cost of financing from retained profits i.e.
forgone interest). Therefore, not surprisingly, the least leveraged groups of
taxpayers in this regard (constructions, hotels and catering, business services,
distribution, other services) are the groups who actually constitute the majority
(71%) of corporate taxpayers in the UK.
83. Review of empirical studies
Much of the literature has studied the effects of tax policies and the effective
tax rates in altering the behaviour of firms vis-à-vis investment, financial decisions,
income shifting, and tunnelling. The earlier work on the impact of taxation on
investment decisions by firms was provided by Hall and Jorgenson (1967),
Summers (1981), Feldstein (1982), Chirinko and Eisner (1983), Poterba and
Summers (1983), and Chirinko (1987). More recent studies using firm-level data
give much better results due to better information. For example, Blundell, Bond,
Devereux, and Schiantarelli (1992), Auerbach and Hessett (1992), Devereux, Keen
and Schiantarelli (1994), Bernstein and Shah (1994) and Devereux, Lockwood, and
Redoano (2002). Further surveys on the impact of corporate income taxes on the
location of capital maybe found in Devereux and Griffith (2002). The overall
conclusion that emerges from the above literature is that taxes do affect investment
decisions, although the size of the effect is less clear. While the existing literature
examines the impact of tax policy on investment decisions, this paper seeks to
determine this causal relationship in opposite direction, from investments made by
firms to their corporation taxes.
Auerbach (2001) reviews the portion of literature that has focussed on
corporate financial policy, including choices about firm ownership structure. In its
simplest terms, financial policy relates to two key choices that firms make: (1) how
much of their capital structure to support by debt, rather than equity; and (2) how
much of their earnings to retain for use as internal equity finance, rather than
distributing dividends and raising new equity in the market. There are many
influences on a firm’s choice between debt and equity finance, so it is not
surprising that retained profits remain the major source of finance for many firm
despite the tax advantage of debt (Bond, Devereux, Gammie, 1996). Edwards
(1987) provides a more detailed introduction to the literature on capital structure.
Scholes and Wolfson (1992) discuss in detail the difficulties tax authorities face in
identifying financial innovation and the dilemma of how to resolve them. For more
discussion on the impact of taxes on the financial decisions of firms, see Mintz
(1996), Graham (1999), Goolsbee (1998), Graham et al.(1998) MacKie-Mason
(1990), MacKie-Mason et al. (1997), Miller (1977), and Stiglitz (1973).
Dividends represent the equity policy of organizations whose tax treatment
9is non-neutral in the UK. Empirical evidence suggests that taxes do influence
company dividends (Bond et al., 1995). The share of profits paid out as dividends
to shareholders increased sharply in the UK after 1985, and is exceptionally high
by international standards (Bond et al., 1995). It is for this reason that the dividend
policy of the firm is included as an explanatory variable to determine its impact on
tax liabilities. Both survey and econometric evidence indicates that some company
investment is constrained by a shortage of internally generated finance (Bond and
Meghir, 1994). High dividend payments may therefore have an adverse effect on
the level of investment.
The literature has also examined the issues of transfer pricing and income
shifting vis-vis tax policies in different jurisdictions. Examples of such studies
include Jenkins and Wright (1975), Bernard and Weiner (1990), Kopits (1976),
Gubert and Mutti (1991), Hines and Rice (1994), Harris et al. (1993), Mutti
(1993), Collins et al. (1996) Grubert (1996), Rousslang (1997) and Grubert (1997).
Newlon (2000) evaluates the empirical evidence and concludes that cross-border
incoming shifting by multinational companies is of some significance. Just how
significant is still unclear, given the possible flaws and sometimes mixed results of
the empirical estimates. The present study examines the influence of organizational
structure, represented by the number of subsidiaries and holdings, on corporation
tax payments with a view to estimate the reverse causality.
In many countries, controlling shareholders are accused of tunnelling,
transferring resources from companies where they have few cash flow rights to
ones where they have more cash flow rights (Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan,
2000). This diversion can take many forms (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes
and Shleifer 2000). High (or low) interest rate loans, selling of inputs or purchase
of outputs at non-market prices, leasing of assets, and guarantees of other
companies’ borrowing are only a few of the readily available ways to tunnel.
Johnson, Boone and Friedman (2000) showed that countries with better legal
protection against tunnelling were less affected by the emerging markets financial
crises of 1997-98. Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2000) have noted that
tunnelling can have large consequences. Because well-functioning capital markets
require that outside shareholders benefit from their holdings, tunnelling may raise a
serious barrier to financial development. The very process of transferring resources
may also entail social costs. For example, it may reduce the transparency of the
10
entire economy, clouding accounting numbers and making it hard to infer the
health of the firms. An equally important effect of tunnelling that has gone
unnoticed in the literature is its negative impact on tax revenues. Firms also tend to
reduce their tax liabilities through tunnelling.
It is in this backdrop that this study seeks to capture the effects of
investments, corporate financial and dividend policy, and tunnelling on the
corporate tax liabilities of firms- and not vice versa.
4. Econometric model
This section introduces an alternative approach to corporate tax modelling. The
purpose is to provide an insight into the factors that determine corporate tax
liabilities of firms.
4.1 The conceptual framework
Based on the analyses of the UK tax system and considering the limitations
of microsimulation models of firms, this paper seeks to suggest an econometric
approach to modelling the corporate tax liabilities of UK firms. The econometric
model aims to identify the micro (firm level) factors that potentially affect firms’
tax liabilities. The intuition behind this framework is as follows:
(1) Corporate taxation not only alters the investment behaviour of
companies, their financial decisions relating to dividend policy and debt-
equity ratios and choices regarding ownership structure and organizational
forms, but also these factors are used by corporations to reduce their corporate
tax payments. Thus the causation also runs from these variables to corporate
tax liabilities of firms. Age, size, and number of subsidiaries and holdings
provide ample opportunities for firms to tunnel their resources from one firm
to another and practice such activities as concessional loans to their sister
organizations, buying inputs at a higher prices from parent companies and
selling outputs to other firms in the pyramid at lower than market rates. These
advantages are not available to smaller and younger companies. Thus such
factors are likely to have a significant impact on corporate tax liabilities.
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Moreover, these variables also control for firms’ heterogeneity, which poses a
main problem in tax forecasting.
(2) Tax codes allowing companies to deduct various expenses, claim
certain allowances and receive tax credits affect the behaviour of companies
and they resort to tunnelling and tax sheltering to reduce their tax liabilities.
As a legal activity, tax sheltering is rampant and is considered to significantly
reduce corporate tax revenues. It has been shown in the previous section that
tax revenue forgone on account of capital allowances and interest deductions
is colossal.
(3) The errors in the forecast process using microsimulation models
could be attributed to the inadequacies of the accounting variables used for
forecasting process. It is not merely a gross measure of ‘trading profits or
losses’ and ‘capital gains’ that determine the corporate tax liabilities. For an
indication of the companies tax behaviour, it is equally important to look at
the gross profit rates (the ratio of gross profit to turnover) and net profit rate
(the ratio of net profit to turnover) of companies, which reflect the level of
cost of sales and other expenses. These are usual channels through which
corporations reduce tax liabilities. Even such one-off items as exceptional
items and extraordinary items which are employed by companies for window
dressing to present their accounting profits in an impressive manner, are
equally important in determining tax liabilities. Each of these factors is
included in the model as a separate explanatory variable.
(4) Since the taxes paid in any year may not be related to the actual
profits in that year due to carrying forward of previous credits and carrying
back of current credits or losses, and the effects of various factors regarding
firms’ financial decisions may also be spread over the next periods, the study
prescribes a panel data model covering a six year time period.
Figure 1 provides an intuitive framework for the model highlighting the
various factors in tax accounting, statutory allowances and deductions, and
corporate structures and financial policies that determine tax liabilities.
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Figure 1:  Determinants of corporate tax liabilities
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Following Mintz (1996) the tax base of corporation tax (CT) in the UK maybe
defined as follows:
CT  =  R – C – Dep  – I
where
R = accrued revenues
C = current costs (salaries, advertisement and material expenditure)
Dep =  economic depreciation of assets
I = Interests paid
4.2 Structural model
Corporation tax is modelled as a function of profits chargeable to tax,
allowances, deductions and tax credits, and firm characteristics and financial
policies which affect tax liabilities. The structural model representing the
corporation tax system in the UK is as follows:
TttZfCorptax iiiit  1,,1),,( === ταπ τττ (1)
where 'Corptax' is Corporation tax chargeable on taxable profits earned by
incorporated and unincorporated businesses and associations (i) during accounting
period (t) . τπ i  is a vector of  variables reflecting different sources of taxable profit
such as gross profit, expenses, operating profit, other income and
exceptional/extraordinary items)  in the profit and loss account statement of firm i
in period τ .  Allowances and deductions (such as capital allowances, interest, and
(other deductions) are represented by the vector τα i  and τiZ  is a vector of variables
representing company profile (including age, size and organizational form) and
corporate financial policies which influence tax liabilities.
Identities:
pbt =  pbi + intp 
pbi = op + otinc ± excep  ± extit
op = gp - otexp 
gp = turn – cossal
where
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pbt =  profit before tax (chargeable to corporation tax)
pbi =  profit before interest
intp = interest paid
op =  operating/trading profit
otinc = incomes from other sources
excep = exceptional items (±)
extit = extraordinary item (±)
gp = gross profit
otexp = other expenses (charged to Profit and Loss account)
turn = turn over
cossal = cost of sales ( manufacturing or trading expenses)
Table 1 shows the variables in each vector to be estimated in the model.
Table 1: Vectors of explanatory variables
 
π
 
a Z Dummy Variables
Turnover Interest paid Age Years
Cost of sales Depreciation Number of
Subsidiaries
Consolidated /
unconsolidated
accounts
Gross profit Employees’
remunerations
Number of
Holdings
Other expenses Directors
remunerations
Size (Turnover)
Operating profit Asset structure
Other income Liability Structure/
Long-term liability
Exceptional Items Investments
Extraordinary items Working capital
Dividend payout
ratio
Given the fact that all the above factors interact with each other, there will
invariably be some degree of multicollinearity in the model, which makes it
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somewhat difficult to disentangle the separate effects of each of the explanatory
variables. However the model does clearly identify highly intercorrelated
explanatory variables and the reduced form equations do not use combinations of
variables which are highly correlated. For instance, the instrument interest paid is
not estimated along with long-term liability or cost of sales and extraordinary
items, which are highly correlated.
The econometric model is estimated in linear form using an unbalanced
panel of companies in three diverse sectors over the period from 1995 to 2000.
Variants of the reduced form of equation (1) are used in the estimation. To control
for consolidated and unconsolidated accounts, which are not separated in FAME, a
dummy variable has been included in the model. To reflect changes specific to
certain years, a year dummy variable is also included.
A panel data structure was chosen for the following reasons:
 
(1) There are computational adjustments of income and losses, advance
corporation tax payments relating to the previous/next year and other
accounting practices that make it difficult to estimate corporate tax liabilities
in the same year to which they relate. These adjustments spill over to the next
years and therefore panel data are better able to incorporate the dynamics of
adjustment and can give unbiased results.
(2) Panel data control for individual heterogeneity. Since individual
firms are heterogeneous, cross section and time-series studies would not
control for this heterogeneity and therefore run the risk of getting biased
results.
(3) Panel data give more informative data, more variability, less
collinearity among variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency.
Time series studies are plagued with multicollinearity and cross section data
adds a lot of variability (Baltagi, 1995).
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4.3 Hypotheses and a priori expectations
In the light of the conceptual framework and the structural model, the study
tests the following hypotheses:
1. Firms reduce their tax liabilities through choice of organisational form,
ownership structure, and financial policies. Firms with large number of
subsidiaries and holdings are in a better position to practice tunnelling
and undertake transfer pricing/income shifting. Rational companies
exploit provisions of tax laws to shelter from taxes. Organisational form,
financial policies, and investments affect tax liabilities significantly. The
effect, however, may differ across sectors.
2. Trading profits and capital gains are coarse determinants of corporation
tax. Each component of taxable profit is a significant determinant of tax
liabilities. The tax behaviour of companies can be studied by examining
each source of their profits.
Table 2 suggests expectations a priori for each variable estimated in the model.
Table 2: Variables and expectations a priori
Variable Expectation a priori
Age Taxes are regressive in nature falling more heavily on younger companies. Older
companies are leveraged in reducing tax liabilities and taking advantages of tax
codes to get tax relief. Age is therefore expected to exhibit a negative
relationship with tax burden.
Number of
subsidiaries and
holdings
Companies with a large number of subsidiaries and holdings are able to resort to
tunnelling, deploy tax avoidance instruments, and undertake transfer pricing to
lower their tax liabilities. The number of subsidiaries and holdings are therefore
expected to have a negative impact on corporate tax payments by companies.
Turnover Turnover is used as an instrument for the size of firms. This variable indicates
volume of business and should ordinarily have a positive association with tax
liabilities. It is therefore expected a priori that turnover will have a positive
relationship with the dependent variable.
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Asset structure Companies with more fixed assets are likely to pay lower tax charges since they
have the potential for deductions towards capital allowances that provide relief
for economic depreciation of capital assets. Therefore, asset structure (defined as
the ratio of fixed assets to total assets) is likely to exhibit a negative relationship
with the total tax burden.
Liability
structure
Companies are likely to be leveraged in tax liabilities owing to higher
borrowings and subsequent interest deductions. Hence a negative relationship is
expected between long-term liabilities, which is used as an instrument for
liability structure, and total tax burden.
Working capital Working capital is an indicator of the capital actually employed in the business
and this is used to finance higher stocks in trade. This variable therefore also
increases the cost of sales.
Investment Investments by companies reduce the capital actually employed in the normal
business activities of companies. However, yield on investments has a positive
effect in future periods through enhanced other incomes . It is therefore likely to
result in a positive relationship with corporate tax liabilities. Capital loss will be
negatively associated with tax payments and gains will increase tax liabilities. In
a dynamic structure, the variable may, however, show different correlations with
the dependent variable in current and lagged periods.
Dividend
payouts
A higher dividend payout ratio decreases the level of retained profits that can be
ploughed back into the business. Hence, a negative relationship is expected
between the dividend ratio (defined as the ratio of dividends paid to profit for the
period) and corporation tax paid by companies.
Gross profit Gross profit is calculated by subtracting the cost of sales from turnover. The
higher the gross profit, the higher the operating profits. It is likely that gross
profit will exhibit a positive relationship with the corporate tax liabilities of
firms.
Cost of sales
and expenses
Companies tend to inflate cost of sales and other expenses to reduce their tax
liabilities. These costs lower operating profits. Therefore, cost of sales and other
expenses are likely to exhibit a negative relationship with the tax liability of
firms.
Sources of
profits
Companies are likely to exhibit a strong positive relationship between different
sources of profits (gross trading profit, operating profit, income from other
sources and exceptional items) and the tax liability. However, extraordinary
items (representing one-off costs) is expected to yield a negative sign.
Interest,
depreciations, &
remunerations
Interest, depreciations, and remunerations (employees/directors) are legally
admissible expenses that allow relief to firms for borrowed capital and economic
depreciation of their capital assets.  Therefore a negative relationship between
corporate taxes and these variables is expected. These variables may, however,
behave differently in different sectors. Moreover, employees’ remunerations also
reflect the level of employment, which is an indicator of the size of the firm and
may show a positive sign with corporation tax.
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5. Data description
The data comprises unbalanced panels of 7,306 companies in the hotels and
restaurants sector, 6,594 in business services and 1,484 in transport manufacturing
sectors, for the accounting periods 1995 to 2000. The hotels and restaurants sector
contributed an annual tax revenue of £430 million during 2000, business services
had an annual contribution of £5,256 and the transport and communications sector
contributed an annual corporation tax of £1,394 during the same period. The
numbers of companies filing returns showing trading profits and other income for
the year 2000 in the three sectors were 21,847, 271,398 and 22,116 respectively
(see Appendix B). Data on all variables are taken from Fame, which is a
computerised database on profit and loss accounts, balance sheets, financial ratios
and company profiles of all UK companies reporting accounts to Companies
House. All monetary variables are in £, age shows the number of years since
incorporation, asset structure and dividend payouts are ratios and subsidiaries and
holdings are in numbers. Since there was little change in the number of
subsidiaries and holdings, these variables drop out in the fixed effects estimates
and the dynamic panel regressions and therefore their effects on corporation tax
liabilities are studied by normalizing them by turnover.
The main items in the accounts are a profit and loss account, cash flow
statement and a balance sheet. The notes to the accounts contain a lot of important
information on the breakdown of these items. A profit and loss account shows the
results of the company’s trading over the past financial period. The balance sheet
gives a snapshot of the company’s financial position on one particular date: the last
day of its financial year. All assets and liabilities are shown in the balance sheet.
There is a difference between a balance sheet and a consolidated balance
sheet or group balance sheet. Most companies listed on the stock exchange are not,
in fact, single companies. A (parent) company may have subsidiary companies and
may control them by owning all or a majority of their shares. The head company of
a group is also sometimes called the holding company because it holds the shares
of the subsidiaries. Companies are normally required to present both a balance
sheet and a consolidated or group balance sheet, unless there are no subsidiaries.
Companies are not required to publish a parent company profit and loss account,
only a consolidated one that shows the aggregate of the profits and losses of all the
19
companies in the group. Since the companies in the data set are a mix of those with
consolidated and unconsolidated accounts, a dummy variable is used to find out if
the results are the same under the two parameters.
Fixed assets represent mainly the buildings and plants on which depreciation
or amortization is charged to the profit and loss account. They are not necessarily
fixed in a physical sense. They are fixed because they are not something the
company is buying or selling or processing in the course of its normal trade.
Capital allowances represent relief on depreciation of such assets. Asset structure
is defined as the ratio of the fixed assets of the company to its total assets.
Likewise, liability structure is defined as a ratio of total liabilities to total assets.
Since both asset structure and liability structure are taken as ratios of total assets, in
order to avoid collinearity between them, the level of long term liabilities is used as
a proxy for the liability structure. Dividend policy is defined as the ratio of
dividends paid to profits for the period. Turnover, gross profit, cost of sales and
operating profit are self-explanatory. Turnover is used as an instrument for the size
of firms. The relationship between accounting variables is shown in Figure 1.
As Brett (2000) has noted, there are some minor complexities that need to be
addressed. If a company has an interest in associated companies or related
companies (companies which are not subsidiaries, but in which it has a significant
shareholding) it will show its proportionate share of profits from these companies
as a separate item and include them in the pre-tax profit figure.  There are some
one-off items that distort profits in a particular way. These items appear under the
heading either of exceptional items or extraordinary items. They could include
items such as costs incurred in closing down a subsidiary business or windfall
profits on the sale of a surplus factory. Neither item represents a normal feature of
the company’s trading. Exceptional items are added or subtracted in the published
accounts above the line before reaching a pre-tax profit figure. Extraordinary
items, however, do not affect the published pre-tax profits or published earnings
but are deducted below the line after calculating net profits after tax. What is
considered exceptional and what is extraordinary has been a matter for some
debate. In practice, companies treat favourable items such as windfall profits as
exceptional and therefore include them in published pre-tax profits. Unpleasant
one-off items such as factory closure costs are more likely to be treated as
extraordinary and deducted after tax where they are not so easily spotted. This
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window-dressing has not escaped the accounting authorities and a new accounting
standard FRS3 has come into force which obliges companies to treat virtually all
one-off items as exceptional and add or subtract them before arriving at pre-tax
profits and earnings per share. It is due to the significance of these one-off items
for corporate tax liabilities that these have been included in the model.
Data on research and development expenditure was not available and
therefore is not included in the estimation.
The additional corporate tax liability determined by tax authorities by way of
full and aspect enquiries (which add back inadmissible expenses and make other
adjustments to arrive at the income chargeable to corporation tax) provide accurate
tax liabilities of firms. However, for reasons of confidentiality access to Inland
Revenue data was not possible. This problem does not, however, invalidate our
results for two reasons:
(1) The additional liability of corporate tax generated by the Inland
Revenue during the latest year (2000-01) as a consequence of 4,292 full
enquiries and 67,222 aspect enquiries yielded £511.9 million.  This is equivalent
to 2.96 % of the mainstream corporation tax revenue (£17,303 million) from
industrial and commercial businesses (including public corporations), but
excluding financial, life assurance and North Sea oil and gas companies. This
additional liability is 2.33% of the chargeable corporation tax revenue, which
stands at £21,927 million from such companies. Thus, the additional tax liability
determined in terms of the percentage of total tax constitutes a statistically
insignificant figure.
(2) Since the study has used panel data over six years, any additional
corporation tax paid by the companies is adjusted in the accounts of the
companies, making the margin of error even more negligible.
6. Estimation Results
This section reports the estimation results of different reduced form
equations for three unbalanced panels involving 7306 hotels and restaurants, 6594
computer consultancy firms, and 1484 transport (road, air, marine) manufacturing
companies, over a period of 6 years from 1995 to 2000. The model has been
estimated separately for different sectors to see how the coefficients on the
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different variables behave for diverse sectors. For instance, the capital-intensive
industries are likely to consume more capital allowances than firms in the service
industry, which normally have lower capital requirements.
The t-statistics are in parenthesis. The diagnostics performed test
specifications, fixed effects, serial correlations, Sargan’s test of over-identifying
restrictions and parametric restrictions tests. Equation 1 in the tables 3 & 4 below
(and equations 2&3 in appendices C&D) represent variants of the reduced form of
equation (1) and estimate alternative combinations of different instruments which
do not correlate with the explanatory variables included in the same equation. For
instance, turnover is used as instrument for the size of the firm. However, turnover
is correlated with number of subsidiaries and holdings, which, though included in
the model to represent organizational structure, also reflect the size of the firms.
Therefore, where turnover is used, as in equation 3, subsidiaries and holdings are
not included. Likewise, long-term liability is used as an instrument to represent the
liability structure of firms, therefore, when it is included in the equation, its
correlated variable interest paid is excluded. Similarly, cost of sales if used in
conjunction with both turnover and gross profit, would be collinear. Also, asset
structure and depreciation are correlated with each other.
First, a random effects model was estimated. The random effects model
assumes that ‘the unobserved effect’ is uncorrelated with all the explanatory
variables in each time period.  In this model, it is assumed that the individual
effects are randomly distributed across a cross-section of firms. Since the data
represented highly heterogeneous firms with the unobservable firm differences
correlated with the explanatory variables examined in the model, it was expected a
priori that data would reject random effects.  The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian
Multiplier test for random effects, which entails null hypothesis that variance (u) =
0, failed to reject the null and confirmed this a priori expectation.
The fixed effect or ‘within’ specification was estimated and the results are
presented in table 3 (two more equations were estimated and their results are
reported in appendix C). Like first differencing, fixed effects estimator uses a
transformation to remove the unobserved effect prior to estimation. Any time-
constant explanatory variables are removed along with unobserved effect. The
resulting coefficients on the explanatory variables show their effects abstracting
from the unobservable firm differences.
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Table 3: Fixed Effects estimation
Dependent Variable: Corporation tax
Explanatory
Variables
Hotels and
Restaurants
Business Services
(Computer consultancy)
Transport
Manufacturing
Age -77.856
(-0.50)
-181.33**
(-2.05)
-59.8
(-0.44)
Subsidiaries -21864.46
(-0.02)
-906398**
(-1.87)
-168220.9
(-0.19)
Holdings -45503.15
(-0.07)
237410.7
(0.12)
1729159
(0.31)
Dividends -194.3**
(-1.67)
27.57
(0.57)
715.19***
(5.02)
Investment 0.065***
(10.15)
-0.004
(-0.48)
-0.058***
(-3.68)
Working capital -0.045***
(-2.86)
-0.130***
(-33.33)
0.019*
(1.60)
Long-term liability 0.0006
(0.17)
0.030***
(6.12)
0.007**
(2.26)
Asset structure -2397.88
(-0.91)
1198.97
(1.00)
-5633.8***
(-2.37)
Gross profit 0.0188
(1.12)
0.073***
(9.89)
0.073***
(6.18)
Operating profit 0.185***
(8.27)
0.085***
(9.12)
0.027***
(4.95)
Other income 0.239***
(14.02)
0.062**
(2.04)
0.137***
(2.68)
Exceptional items 0.0296***
(3.85)
0.047***
(6.12)
0.039***
(2.84)
Extraordinary items -0.051**
(-1.71)
-0.007
(-0.03)
-0.003
(0.32)
Remunerations -0.033**
(-1.96)
0.0258***
(3.91)
-0.093***
(-5.87)
Directors’
remunerations
-0.632*
(-1.33)
0.668**
(1.85)
1.12**
(2.11)
Accounts dummy 82.226
(0.05)
64.55
(0.10)
-2708.8^
(-1.23)
1996 76.477
(-0.12)
145.65
(0.42)
1.12**
(2.11)
1997 -20.003
(-0.04)
270.27
(0.83)
376.24
(0.72)
1998 -317.98
(-0.61)
34.33
(0.11)
495.8
(1.19)
1999 343.310
(0.65)
8.13
(0.03)
230.22
(0.53)
2000 Dropped Dropped Dropped
Constant 5764.61
(0.94)
3275.54**
(1.82)
8043.2**
(1.64)
Observations 572 521 368
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Explanatory
Variables
Hotels and
Restaurants
Business Services
(Computer consultancy)
Transport
Manufacturing
F-stat (20,328)=
27.71
(20,231)=
138.87
(20,213)=
15.34
R. squared:       within
  between
overall
0.628
0.483
0.562
0.923
0.267
0.429
0.590
0.00
0.03
F test for fixed effects
(All u_i= 0)
(223, 328) =10.44
Pr>F=0.00
(269, 231) =4.08
Pr>F=0.00
(134,213)
=6.06 Pr>F=0.0
Parametric restriction
test for year dummies
F(4, 328) = 0.33
Pr>F=0.85
F(4, 231) = 0.23
Pr>F=0.92
F(4,203) = 0.37
Pr>F=0.83
Parametric restriction
test for accts. dummy
F(1, 328) = 0.00
Pr>F= 0.96
F(1, 231) = 0.01
Pr>F= 0.92
F(1,213) = 1.51
Pr>F= 0.22
*** statistically significant at 1 % level , **statistically significant at 5% level , *statistically significant at
10% level, ^marginally significant
The high R2 indicates that corporate tax liabilities of the companies
examined are explained reasonably well by the model. For instance, for the
business services sector, the R2 for the fixed effects (within) estimator ranges
between 90.1 and 92.3 per cent suggesting variations in the corporate tax liabilities
of firms are explained by the model satisfactorily. The F-test confirms the joint
significance of the fixed effects and the explanatory variables in all equations
reported.
Clearly the taxation system is dynamic and any business modelling would
need to address issues of adjustment. The model in this paper is characterized by
dynamic relationships between various explanatory variables and the dependent
variable. In order to abstract from contemporaneity, a dynamic panel data model
was estimated and the results of these estimations are reported in table 4 (two more
equations were estimated and their results are reported in appendix D). The
explanatory variables included the lagged dependent variable and all the
explanatory variables and their two period lags. The lagged variables on age were
dropped due to collinearity.
Arellano and Bond (1991) propose a test for the hypothesis that there is no
second-order serial correlation for the disturbances of the first-differenced
equation. This test is important as consistency of the GMM estimator depends on
the hypothesis being true. There was no autocorrelation found in residuals of order
1 and/or 2 in all equations reported.
24
Table 4: Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel Data regressions
Dependent Variable: Corporation tax
Explanatory
variables
Hotels and Restaurants Business Services
(Computer consultancy)
Transport
(Manufacturing)
Corporation tax
                          L
-0.366***
(-3.40)
-1.506***
(-4.72)
0.145**
(1.68)
L2 0.0244
(0.14)
-0.711*
(-1.41)
0.446***
(4.07)
Age -25142.1
(-0.57)
15572.86
(0.30)
39861.46
(0.32)
Subsidiaries 126115.7
(0.45)
2761786***
(4.18)
-4109447**
(-1.98)
L 1095652*
(1.62)
-3137842***
(-3.93)
6402343**
(1.89)
L2 1186143*
(1.45)
114699.9
(0.51)
-7930831**
(-2.24)
Holdings 8841001
(0.70)
-3241090
(-0.92)
3694634
(0.36)
L 7007082
(0.68)
4510824
(0.93)
-1.35e+07
(-0.74)
L2 3440321
(0.44)
1768026
(0.63)
1.09e+07
(0.87)
Dividends -21.423
(-0.96)
50.978
(0.86)
-86.397
(-0.70)
L -50.102
(-0.91)
65.020
(0.78)
735.02**
(1.64)
L2 97.803
(1.18)
29.561
(0.27)
968.16***
(2.62)
Investments -0.025***
(-2.68)
0.0128
(0.44)
0.138***
(7.03)
L -0.081***
(-2.64)
0.317***
(3.45)
0.196***
(6.02)
L2 0.0243*
(1.34)
0.039
(0.47)
-0.190***
(-5.35)
Working capital -0.062***
(-3.21)
0.091^
(1.21)
0.163***
(7.25)
L -0.053**
(-3.81)
0.049
(0.82)
0.025^
(1.19)
L2 0.052*
(1.41)
-0.079^
(-1.26)
-0.046*
(-1.36)
Long-term
liability
0.011***
(2.64)
0.021
(0.90)
-0.032***
(-4.94)
L 0.011***
(2.53)
0.008
(0.41)
-0.0055
(-0.74)
L2 -0.094
(-0.87)
0.202***
(4.83)
-0.053***
(-3.46)
Asset structure -949.555
(-1.16)
-795.71
(-1.16)
829.64
(0.42)
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Explanatory
variables
Hotels and Restaurants Business Services
(Computer consultancy)
Transport
(Manufacturing)
L 2005.32**
(2.17)
-663.66
(-0.89)
-2175.83
(-0.62)
L2 764.252
(0.90)
-169.55
(-0.27)
-1352.13
(-0.42)
Gross profit 0.033**
(1.72)
-0.165***
(-2.69)
0.072
(0.93)
L -0.130***
(-4.42)
0.129*
(1.40)
0.042
(0.53)
L2 -0.126**
(-3.24)
-0.23
(-0.27)
0.228***
(4.24)
Operating profit 0.103***
(2.92)
0.429***
(7.48)
-0.096
(-1.16)
L 0.048*
(1.43)
0.346***
(2.78)
-0.176***
(-2.41)
L2 0.068
(0.96)
0.293**
(2.02)
-0.307***
(-4.00)
Other income 0.426***
(4.41)
1.479***
(4.05)
-0.163**
(-1.78)
L 0.007
(-0.15)
0.289
(0.25)
-0.081
(-0.78)
L2 0.141***
(2.48)
-1.86***
(-3.09)
-1.199***
(-7.55)
Exceptional items -0.028
(-1.01)
0.1551^
(1.23)
0.111***
(2.62)
L 0.021
(0.73)
0.682***
(4.71)
0.088
(0.79)
L2 0.224***
(2.87)
0.648***
(5.06)
-0.0227*
(-1.47)
Extraordinary
items
0.147***
(5.000)
- -0.0669**
(-1.92)
L 0.172***
(4.74)
- -0.044*
(-1.33)
L2 0.234***
(6.16)
- -0.0227*
(-1.47)
Employees’
Remunerations
-0.093***
(-2.88)
0.080*
(1.61)
-0.176***
(-4.43)
L 0.124***
(2.86)
-0.585***
(-3.73)
0.009
(0.15)
L2 0.0015***
(0.06)
0.277*
(1.61)
-0.011
(-0.27)
Directors’
remunerations
-0.281*
(-1.33)
0.153
(0.49)
2.23***
(3.35)
L 0.496*
(1.37)
0.801*
(1.52)
-0.422
(-0.57)
L2 1.616***
(4.73)
1.738***
(2.54)
-2.75***
(-2.66)
Constant 25229.97
(0.58)
-15660.85
(-0.31)
-39906.08
-0.32
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Explanatory
variables
Hotels and Restaurants Business Services
(Computer consultancy)
Transport
(Manufacturing)
No. of
observations
97 47 63
No. of groups 50 30 32
Wald test Chi2 (45)=
43743.59
Chi2 (42)=
20517.87
Chi2 (45)=
3368.48
Sargan test of
over-identifying
restrictions
Chi2 (9)=
21.70
Pr>chi2=  0.01
Chi2 (8)=
2.89
Pr>chi2= 0.94
Chi2 (9)=
9.79
Pr>chi2= 0.37
Arellano-Bond
test of no auto-
correlation
z= -1.73
Pr>z= 0.08
No autocorrelation in
residuals of order 1&2
z= -1.69
Pr>z= 0.09
No autocorrelation in
residuals of order 1&2
z= 1.92
Pr>z= 0.055
No autocorrelation in
residuals of order 2
*** statistically significant at 1 % level  **significant at 5% level  *significant at 10% level ^marginally
significant. L denotes one-period lagged, and L2 denotes two-period lagged variable.
Testing overidentifying restrictions is very important in the context of
Instrument Variables (IV) estimation. It is a requirement of the IV estimation that
each instrument variable must be uncorrelated with the error. Sargan’s test of
overidentifying restrictions entails a null hypothesis that all IVs are uncorrelated
with the error. The results reported in table 4 show that, except for one single
equation in the hotels and restaurants sector, all equations estimated failed to reject
the null hypothesis, suggesting that the choice of all the instruments in the model is
satisfactory and none of the explanatory variables is correlated with the
disturbance.
The above results mostly confirm the hypotheses and a priori expectations.
Corporate profile, structure and financial policy 
The coefficient on age is invariably negative in all the equations in the fixed
effects estimations and statistically significant for firms engaged in business
services. However, age shows mostly positive signs in the dynamic panel results
and is statistically insignificant in all but one equation. Therefore, it would appear
that the size of the age effect on corporate tax payments is small and its
relationship is a non-linear one. New entrants into business pay more taxes as their
main financial source of running the business is equity finance and their ability to
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manipulate and reduce tax liabilities is limited. However, as they grow older they
are able to reduce their tax liabilities by taking advantage of tax provisions and
using transfer pricing instruments between their affiliated companies. This is also
evident from variables forming the vector α and the number of subsidiaries and
holdings being negatively associated with corporate tax liabilities. The negative
relationship between age and the tax liability seems to be available for the initial
few years only when firms are in the process of settling in the market.
The coefficients on number of subsidiaries and holdings normalized by
turnover are negative but generally insignificant in the fixed effects model. For the
firms carrying on business of computer consultancy, the coefficient on subsidiaries
is statistically significant in one of the two fixed effects estimations reported.
However, for the dynamic specification of the model, the coefficients on the
number of subsidiaries in the current and lagged periods are significant and
negatively associated with corporation tax payments for two major sectors studied,
business services and transport manufacturing. The latter include all major
corporations engaged in the manufacturing of cars, aircrafts, and marine ships.
This suggests that, normalizing turnover, firms with a large number of subsidiaries
manage to reduce their future tax liabilities by transfer pricing and tunnelling.
Similarly, in the dynamic panel regressions, the coefficients on the number of
holdings one period lagged is negative and significant in one equation in the hotels
and restaurants and has insignificant and mixed signs elsewhere. The dynamic
panel results (table 4) suggest that companies with affiliated concerns resort to
tunnelling and other tax avoidance measures to reduce their tax liabilities. The fact
that the variables cost of sales (in equations 3 - appendices C&D) and interest
payments and directors’ remunerations are negative and statistically significant in
the fixed effects models as well as the dynamic panel regressions shows that
organizations with a large number of subsidiaries and holding companies reduce
their corporation tax payments by transfer pricing. This can take the form of
inflating costs of business, creating fictitious intra-company loans, getting tax
relief for interest payments and paying exorbitant remunerations to their directors.
This finding is in line with the existing empirical evidence (for instance, Kopits
(1976)) on transfer pricing which suggests multinational companies transfer their
incomes to different jurisdictions by royalty payments. The results are also in line
with the existing literature on tunnelling. As argued in section 3, in many countries
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controlling shareholders are accused of tunnelling, transferring resources from
companies where they have few cash flow rights to ones where they have more
cash flow rights. This diversion can take many forms. High (or low) interest rate
loans, selling of inputs or purchase of outputs at non-market prices, leasing of
assets, and guarantees of other companies’ borrowing are only a few of the readily
available ways to tunnel. As noted by Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2000),
tunnelling can have large consequences. Because well-functioning capital markets
require that outside shareholders benefit from their holdings, tunnelling may raise a
serious barrier to financial development. The very process of transferring resources
may also entail social costs. For example, it may reduce the transparency of the
entire economy, clouding accounting numbers and making it hard to infer the
health of firms. It is in this backdrop that the results of present study make an
important contribution, showing that tunnelling, if prevalent, can reduce tax
liabilities thereby causing a drain on public revenues. This also indicates the
channels through which firms transfer their incomes and reduce tax liabilities. This
has repercussions for corporate governance in an international context.
Equation 3 (reported in the appendices C&D) disentangles the effects of the
organizational form from size, proxied by turnover, and includes turnover as an
explanatory variable exclusive of subsidiaries and holdings.  The coefficient on
turnover is positive and significant at the 1% level. This confirms that the bulk of
the tax revenue comes from large companies and the contribution by the younger
and smaller firms is relatively very small. This is as per the UK Inland Revenue
data of tax payments by size.
The fixed effects results show a very significant, positive sign on the
investment coefficient in the two sectors, hotels and restaurants and business
services. This is in line with the hypothesis and a priori expectations that
investments made by companies yield more capital gains and this increases their
corporate tax liabilities. However, investment behaviour vis-à-vis corporation tax is
best explained in the dynamic setting. As the dynamic panel results (table 4)
indicate, investments made in the current period will have positive effect on
earnings in the following periods. In the shorter run, investments in portfolios
mean that less capital is available to be invested in the main trading activities. The
transport sector, which is the largest sector in terms of the size of individual
companies examined, shows the opposite sign on investment. The fixed effects
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results indicate that innovative investments have a negative association with
corporate tax liabilities and the dynamic specification shows a significant, positive
impact on tax liability in the short run and a statistically significant negative effect
in the longer run (after two accounting periods). Therefore, we can say that
investment is strongly related with corporation tax payments; however, the nature
of its relationship will depend on the conditions in the capital markets and how
prudently corporations manage their funds.
Working capital is found to have a statistically significant negative
relationship with tax liabilities. This is consistent with the hypothesis that working
capital adversely affects corporation tax through enhanced cost of sales which has
the effect of reducing operating profit. The results are further confirmed by the
variable cost of sales itself being negative and significant in equations 3. Here
again, transport sector has shown a different trend. In the current period, the inflow
of additional capital enhances business profits and the consequential tax liabilities.
However, working capital in the current period reduces future tax liabilities in this
sector, which is predominately characterised by large business groups. This
indicates the possibility of an intra-group set off of losses in future periods to
reduce tax payments.
The dividend ratio, which reflects the dividend policy of firms, is significant
and negatively related with corporate tax payments in the fixed effects estimations
for the hotels and restaurants and transport sectors. It is insignificant for firms in
the business services sector. In the dynamic panel regressions, the hotels and
restaurants, which is relatively a smaller sector, shows a negative association
between dividends and corporation tax payments. In the larger sectors, namely
transport manufacturing and business services, dividend payout ratios are
positively associated with corporation tax liabilities in the lagged periods.
However, the dynamic panel data results confirm that the current year’s dividend
payouts do not affect corporate tax liabilities in the same year. This result conforms
to the UK tax system.  The existing literature finds that, in the UK, companies have
higher payout dividend ratios and that share of profits paid out as dividends to
shareholders increased sharply in the UK after 1985, and is exceptionally high by
international standards (Bond et al., 1995). This would suggest that for the giant
companies, the high dividend ratios increase the volume of their stocks traded in
the markets, which enhances their financial position, resulting in higher capital
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gains and tax payments. However, for the relatively smaller companies the
relationship between dividend payouts and the corporate tax liabilities is negative.
The dynamic panel regressions further confirm that the effects of dividend
payments spread over future periods.
Liability structure, proxied by long-term liabilities, is found to have positive,
significant association with tax liabilities. In the dynamic panel, the coefficient on
liability structure shows different signs for different sectors. For the hotels and
restaurant sectors, and transport sectors, the coefficients show a negative
association with corporation tax in the long run. Business services firms show a
positive effect of borrowed capital on their earnings and tax liabilities. This is also
evident from the coefficient on interest payments being positive and statistically
significant for this sector in the fixed effects model.
Asset structure mostly shows an insignificant association with tax liabilities.
It produces a statistically significant negative sign in the transport sector in the
fixed effects model only. However, for the dynamic specification, only the lagged
variable is significantly (but positively) correlated with current tax liabilities in the
hotels sector. This shows that the asset structure does not have a linear relationship
with the corporation tax liabilities.
Components of accounting profits
Different sources of profits, namely gross trading profit, net operating profit,
other incomes (capital gains) are all, as expected, statistically significant and yield
positive signs in the fixed effects model, showing that each of these items is
individually significant in determining corporate tax payments. Interestingly, the
dynamic panel regressions show that for the business services and transport sectors
(the two large sectors), the lagged period operating profits (losses) and other
incomes (capital losses) reduce current tax liabilities. This demonstrates the
existence of huge losses in the larger groups. This may possibly be due to the effect
of tunnelling through subsidiaries and holdings, which, as shown already, have a
significant impact in reducing the corporation tax payments in these sectors. The
regressions, however, produce very strong and consistent results vis-à-vis one-off
items, that is exceptional items and extraordinary items, which often get neglected
by researchers and microsimulation modellers. The results show that both
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exceptional items (windfall profits from one particular venture) as well as
extraordinary items (generally relating to one-time incurred costs) significantly
affect corporation taxes asymmetrically. Exceptional items are positively related
and extraordinary items have negative association with corporation tax.  It may be
mentioned that for tax purposes extraordinary items are included in the cost of
sales, which also has a negative and significant sign in eq.3 (Appendices C&D).
Tax allowances, deductions and reliefs
The results confirm that interest payments, depreciation, employees’
remuneration, and directors’ remuneration have a significant impact on corporation
tax liabilities individually. However, these cost variables behave differently in
different sectors as expected a priori. Employees’ remuneration has a positive,
significant sign in the two labour-oriented sectors, namely hotels and restaurants
and computer consultancy, and a negative sign in the transport manufacturing
sector. This suggests that for labour-intensive industries, remuneration is an
instrument for the size of firms and the higher the number of employees in such
sectors the higher the profits and taxes. However, for transport manufacturing
companies, the remuneration simply indicates an expenditure, which has the effect
of enhancing costs thereby reducing corporation tax payments. In the dynamic
setting, remuneration reduces tax liabilities significantly in the same year of
payments but in the longer run it has a positive effect on taxation. It is no surprise
that for the computer consultancy sector, which requires highly skilled labour, the
variable on depreciation has shown an insignificant association for the dynamic
specification of the model.
Capital allowances, proxied by depreciation, provide relief from tax for the
consumption of capital assets in the business. It was used in the model to represent
reliefs from corporation tax and as such expected to be negatively associated with
CT. However, the existence of large fixed assets, attracting depreciation, also
indicate the volume of the business and confounds with the size of the firm.
Therefore, the higher the depreciation allowance, higher the profits and
corresponding corporation tax. The results reported have accordingly confirmed a
positive and significant relationship between depreciation allowances and
corporate taxes.
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As discussed above, firms in business services sector show a positive effect
of borrowed capital on their earnings and tax liabilities. Therefore, the coefficient
on interest payments is also positive and statistically significant for this sector in
the fixed effects model. In the other sectors interest payments show a negative and
significant relation with corporation tax. Even in the business services sector,
interest paid in the two period lags is negative and statistically significant with
current tax liabilities. This is in agreement with the expectations a priori that
interest payments by the firms are a deductible expense when arriving at profits
chargeable to tax.
Directors’ remuneration shows different behaviour vis-à-vis taxation across
sectors. For the hotels and restaurants sector, this shows a significant, negative
effect on tax liabilities while for the consultancy and transport sectors, it is
positively and significantly associated with dependent variable. As such, the
instruments representing allowances and deductions, and tax reliefs, (interest,
depreciations, remuneration, directors’ remuneration) all have significant
association with corporations’ tax payments asymmetrically.
Lagged dependent variable and dummies
Table 4 shows that corporate tax payments in the previous period
significantly reduce the corporate tax liabilities of the current year in all sectors.
This is consistent with the tax system. Until April 1999, companies were required
to pay advance corporation tax (ACT) at the time of making dividend payments to
their shareholders. This payment was adjusted against the total tax due for the year
after filing returns in the next period, so essentially the corporation tax was paid in
two periods. The advance corporation tax was replaced by a system of quarterly
instalments of anticipated tax liabilities of the next year of large companies. This
was in order to offset the revenue effect of the abolition of ACT.  The marginal tax
rate was also employed as an explanatory variable to check whether the negative
sign on lagged dependent variable was possibly due to tax rates (higher tax rate in
period t-1 will influence tax paid in period t), but that was found to be
insignificant. This would suggest that negative relationship between the last year’s
tax payments and current tax liability is on account of the advanced corporation tax
paid by firms.
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The coefficients on the year dummies show little significance in the model.
Dummy variable for year 2000 dropped out for fewer observations. Likewise, the
results show that for the model there was no statistically significant difference
between the two types of accounts. For the transport sector, the dummy variable on
consolidated/unconsolidated accounts is significant and negatively associated with
tax liabilities. The parametric restriction test again fails to reject the null
hypotheses that the parametric variation between firms is zero.
The dynamic panel regressions show some unexpected signs on certain
coefficients, such as lagged gross profits, lagged directors’ remuneration, and
extraordinary items in the hotels and restaurants sector. The instability of the signs
could be either due to some element of collinearity or possibly the result of some
inherent shortcomings of the Arellano-Bond estimation technique.
In summary, the results highlight the need to consider variables on firms’
size, structure and financial policy and the system of allowances and deductions,
and each element of the profits chargeable to tax, not just information on the main
profit items, to study the tax behaviour of companies. These factors affect
companies’ tax behaviour in a different way in different sectors. With a large
number of highly significant coefficients, often with expected signs, and high
explanatory power, the model provides deep insight into the UK corporate income
tax system and spells out important determinants of corporate tax liabilities which
have not been previously analysed. The model also provides ingredients for any
future microsimulation modelling ventures.
7. Conclusion
This paper has presented estimates of a reduced form model of determinants
of corporate tax liabilities for three important sectors in the UK. Several results
stand out. Firstly, microsimulation models would be prone to forecasting errors if
they only take into account trading profit (loss), capital gains, and profit/loss
patterns of the companies. The econometric model presented here highlights the
need to consider and include additional variables in the forecast process to which
little attention is seemingly paid. Secondly, corporate tax liabilities do not simply
depend on the accounting profits. There are a number of factors that interplay in
the process. We find that size, organizational form, various sources of profitability
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and tax allowances and deductions all affect tax liabilities considerably. Even one-
off transactions, which are reported and classified separately in the account books,
such as exceptional items and extraordinary items significantly increase or
decrease tax liabilities. Thirdly, our findings suggest that firms in pyramids appear
to practice tunnelling not just to transfer resources from one company to the other
to improve financial gains for the controlling shareholders as the existing literature
suggests, but also they do so in order to reduce their tax liabilities and maximise
‘after-tax’ profits. Though tax authorities are powerless to do anything about
corporations’ legitimate involvement in tax sheltering, they ought to look into the
methods of tunnelling by firms in order to detect possible tax evasion, which in
contrast to tax sheltering is illegal. Fourthly, more information on companies’
activities within groups is required to explore the exact nature of relationships
between some variables and corporation tax liabilities. Finally, it is suggested that
econometric methods should be applied in conjunction with microsimulation
models to identify the significant factors affecting corporation tax payments. The
findings have implications for understanding diversity in corporate governance
systems and for systematic analysis of the interaction between financial
regulations, tax codes and social institutions.
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Appendix A
Methods of revenue forecasting
o      Extrapolation
Extrapolating an established linear trend in receipts is the straightforward method of
making an unconditional forecast of revenues from a particular tax. More sophisticated
procedures include the Box-Jenkins ARIMA procedure. In such univariate procedures, the
revenue forecast 
i
tτ from a particular tax i , in a particular time t , depends only on revenues
observed in the past:
.........),.........,( 21 ititit f −−= τττ
This does not involve any knowledge of the tax system, or the relationships between the
revenues and other economic variables, and these techniques are not widely used for revenue
forecasts. Box-Jenkins also requires long time series data.
o     Forecasting using elasticities
The conditional approach to revenues forecasting for a particular tax is to use an elasticity
of revenue from the tax with respect to GDP. This is defined as:
)/).(/( iii TYdYdT=ε
      where 
iε is the elasticity of a particular tax iT with respect to GDP denoted by Y . If ε  is
assumed to be constant, a forecast of 
iε in the forecast period may be derived in a
straightforward way for a forecast of  Y in the same period, together with actual figures for both
iε
 and Y in some previous periods. In practice, this is the most widely used approach.
o     Macroeconomic (regression) models
The assumption that relevant elasticities are constant is questionable. A more general approach is
to use regression methods to estimate functional relationships between revenues from particular
taxes and a variety of macroeconomic variables. An important advantage of econometrically
estimated tax revenue function is that revenue forecasts are integrated with the corresponding
macroeconomic forecasts, ensuring consistency between the two. The limitation of this approach
is that it constrains the revenue forecasts to depend on only a small number of macroeconomic
variables.
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Appendix C
Fixed Effects estimation (Eq.2&3)
Dependent Variable: Corporation tax
Sectors ⇒ Hotels and Restaurants Business Services
(Computer consultancy)
Transport
Manufacturing
Explanatory
variables
Eq. 2 Eq. 3 Eq. 2 Eq. 3 Eq. 2 Eq. 3
Age -69.580
(-0.49)
-119.35
(-0.89)
-203.47**
(-2.10)
-160.84**
(-1.70)
-176.2*
(-1.56)
-99.389
(-0.88)
Number of
subsidiaries
-47185.76
(-0.05)
-656882.7
(-1.19)
-111537.2
(-0.15)
Number of
holdings
-36210.85
(-0.06)
-16983.14
(-0.01)
1628305
(0.38)
Dividend
ratio
-166.30*
(-1.56)
-133.43*
(-1.31)
36.04
(0.61)
42.20
(0.71)
-236.956*
(-1.37)
-224.74*
(-1.30)
Investment 0.044***
(7.04)
0.045***
(7.54)
0.011
(1.00)
0.018**
(1.76)
-0.039***
(-2.83)
-0.0434***
(-3.11)
Working
capital
-0.026**
(-1.88)
-0.006
(-0.41)
-0.127***
(-30.09)
-0.128***
(-30.33)
0.009
(0.92)
0.014*
(1.24)
Turnover 0.073***
(4.71)
0.071***
(8.62)
0.024***
(2.44)
Cost of sales -0.086***
(-5.20)
-0.068***
(-8.32)
-0.017*
(-1.47)
Gross profit 0.073***
(4.45)
0.073***
(9.11)
0.026***
(2.52)
Operating
profit
0.124***
(5.58)
0.127***
(6.30)
0.100***
(9.46)
0.094***
(9.17)
0.032***
(6.62)
0.028***
(5.91)
Other income 0.221***
(14.07)
0.231***
(15.59)
0.119***
(2.33)
0.08**
(1.69)
0.242***
(4.65)
0.190***
(3.69)
Exceptional
items
0.052 ***
(7.03)
0.052***
(7.41)
0.072***
(8.31)
0.068***
(7.68)
0.048***
(3.95)
0.039***
(3.28)
Interest paid -0.536***
(-9.76)
-0.538***
(-10.07)
0.749***
(5.15)
0.773***
(5.06)
-0.086^
(-1.26)
-0.0227
(-0.34)
Depreciation -0.0150
(-1.20)
0.024**
(1.84)
0.058
(1.04)
Remunerat-
ion
0.047 ***
(3.00)
0.067***
(4.00)
0.027***
(3.90)
0.024**
(2.24)
-0.008
(-0.49)
-0.041**
(-1.83)
Directors’
remuneration
- 0.805**
(-1.86)
-0.654*
(-1.57)
0.350
(0.82)
0.646*
(1.41)
0.980**
(2.13)
1.175***
(2.60)
Accounts
dummy
-128.17
(-0.08)
-166.75
(-0.10)
38.65
(0.05)
98.97
(0.14)
-3211.2**
(-1.81)
-3188.97**
(-1.83)
1996 -366.95
(-0.64)
-348.236
(-0.63)
-299.47
(-0.80)
-296.53
(-0.79)
144.22
(0.32)
345.78
(0.77)
1997 -515.56
(-0.99)
-437.23
(-0.87)
204.67
(0.59)
322.43
(0.92)
-97.04
(-0.25)
87.04
(0.23)
1998 -525.11
(-1.12)
-312.73
(-0.68)
-167.48
(-0.51)
-160.74
(-0.49)
129.88
(0.36)
289.9
(0.81)
1999 -300.267
(-0.64)
-233.783
(-0.51)
-235.68
(-0.72)
-259.34
(-0.78)
-265.6
(-0.71)
-147.73
(-0.40)
2000 Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped
2Cons 3150.95
(0.62)
5254.99
(1.09)
2966.12**
(1.66)
1607.926
(1.01)
9149.6**
(2.20)
6761.45*
(1.62)
No. of obs 559 563 575 578 358 360
F-stat (19,318)=
41.18
(17, 323) =
48.13
(19,246)=
122.37
(17,250) =
133.47
(19,203)=
7.42
(917,207) =
7.95
R:     within
  between
overall
0.711
0.617
0.620
0.717
0.405
0.372
0.904
0.407
0.555
0.901
0.563
0.657
0.410
0.235
0.264
0.39
0.17
0.25
F test for
fixed effects
(All u_i= 0)
(221,323)
=13.66
Pr>F=0.00
(222, 323)=
3.62
Pr>F=0.0
(309,246
=3.12
Pr>F=0.00
(310,250)=
2.96
Pr>F=0.0
(135,203)
=7.39
Pr>F=0.0
(135,207)=
6.50
Pr>F=0.0
Parametric
restriction
test for year
dummies
F(4,318)
=0.39
Pr>F=0.81
F(2,323)=0.
23
Pr>F=0.92
F(4,246)
=0.90
Pr>F=0.46
F(4,250)=1.
38
Pr>F=0.24
F(4,203)
=0.36
Pr>F=0.84
F(4,207)=0.
45
Pr>F=0.77
Parametric
restriction
test for accts.
dummy
F(1,318)
=0.01
Pr>F= 0.94
F(1,323)=0.
01
Pr>F= 0.92
F(1,246)
=0.00
Pr>F= 0.95
F(1,250)=0.
02
Pr>F= 0.89
F(1,203)
=3.29
Pr>F= 0.07
F(1,203)=3.
36
Pr>F= 0.07
*** statistically significant at 1 % level , **statistically significant at 5% level, *statistically significant at 10% level, ^
statistically significant at 10% level.
3Appendix D
Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel Data regressions (Eq. 2&3)
Dependent Variable: Corporation tax
Sectors ⇒ Hotels and Restaurants Business Services
(computer consultancy)
Transport
(Manufacturing)
Explanatory
variables
Eq. (2) Eq. (3) Eq. (2) Eq. (3) Eq. (2) Eq. (3)
Corporation
tax              L
-0.176
(-1.00)
-0.617***
(-3.38)
-0.411
(-0.40)
-0.4925
(-0.62)
-0.384**
(-1.79)
-0.755***
(-4.72)
L2 0.381*
(1.40)
0.059
(0.20)
-1.06
(-0.67)
-2.875***
(-2.56)
0.027
(0.12)
0.162*
(1.47)
Age 41448.02
(0.57)
1186.717
(0.02)
-78390.62
(-0.65)
146544.9*
(1.46)
63346.9
(1.07)
59182.3
(0.96)
Subsidiaries 662820.8
(0.35)
2608204
(1.16)
-1145519
(-0.70)
L 303003.4
(0.17)
-3846240
(-1.16)
1617276
(0.62)
L2 -2337439**
(-2.10)
-1836251
(-0.70)
Holdings 1.59e+07
(1.12)
-4367633
(-0.17)
4383424
(0.60)
L -1.26e+07*
(-1.32)
-471366.8
(-0.04)
-1.10e+07
(-0.85)
L2 1671615
(0.24)
6965682
(0.87)
Dividends -0.654
(-0.02)
0.789
(0.02)
-167.501
(-0.57)
-138.101
(-0.60)
75.32*
(1.39)
8.897
(0.16)
L 100.300
(-1.06)
-137.9**
(-1.88)
129.779
(0.41)
461.73*
(1.44)
-14.895
(-0.06)
-0.105
(-0.00)
L2 -118.386
(-0.92)
 -172.92*
(-1.26)
196.80
(0.58)
424.898*
(1.42)
226.345
(0.83)
143.453
(0.64)
Investments -0.0025
(-0.16)
-0.04***
(-3.24)
-0.349**
(-2.15)
-0.369***
(-2.97)
0.037***
(2.68)
0.084***
(5.05)
L 0.050
(1.10)
0.0113
(0.28)
-0.0046
(-0.01)
-0.186
(-0.62)
-0.029
(-0.79)
-0.035
(-0.64)
L2 0.016
(0.45)
0.095***
(3.10)
-0.877**
(-1.62)
0.119
(0.66)
-0.153***
(-5.78)
-0.102***
(-5.01)
Working
capital
0.0356
(0.81)
-0.0218
(-0.86)
0.248
(1.11)
0.278***
(2.45)
-0.003
(-0.16)
0.0337**
(1.63)
L -0.154***
(-3.53)
-0.10***
(-5.50)
-0.113
(-0.52)
-0.413***
(-2.81)
-0.0226
(-1.23)
-0.012
(-0.65)
L2 -0.197**
(-2.20)
-0.0201
(-0.41)
0.297
(1.26)
0.525***
(3.90)
-0.052*
(-1.47)
-0.118***
(-4.14)
Turnover 0.143***
(4.31)
-0.070
(-0.81)
0.050
(1.05)
L -0.18***
(-3.74)
0.278**
(1.74)
-0.181**
(-2.05)
L2 -0.024
(-0.52)
-0.066
(-0.62)
-0.025
(-0.35)
Cost of sales -0.13***
(-3.58)
0.206**
(2.33)
-0.040
(-0.83)
4Sectors ⇒ Hotels and Restaurants Business Services
(computer consultancy)
Transport
(Manufacturing)
Explanatory
variables
Eq. (2) Eq. (3) Eq. (2) Eq. (3) Eq. (2) Eq. (3)
L 0.210***
(4.80)
-0.262
(-1.25)
0.205**
(2.30)
L2 0.049
(0.96)
0.047
(0.40)
0.031
(0.41)
Gross profit 0.092**
(1.82)
-0.005
(-0.03)
0.022
(0.43)
L -0.152**
(-2.18)
-0.194
(-0.97)
-0.105
(-0.68)
L2 -0.076
(-1.06)
-0.121
(-0.59)
-0.046
(-0.61)
Operating
profit
0.059
(0.88)
-0.021
(-0.50)
0.518***
(4.44)
-0.043
(-0.21)
0.0097
(0.14)
0.161***
(2.30)
L 0.003
(0.04)
0.042
(0.92)
0.467***
(2.42)
0.395**
(1.93)
0.180*
(1.33)
0.285***
(3.56)
L2 -0.113
(-0.91)
.0392
(0.38)
0.621
(1.06)
1.097***
(3.55)
0.159*
(1.59)
0.043
(0.49)
Other
income
0.439***
(3.25)
0.0326
(0.31)
2.393***
(2.30)
3.55***
(4.25)
-0.066
(-0.54)
0.153**
(1.89)
L -0.054***
(-0.51)
-0.098*
(-1.32)
-0.311
(-0.15)
2.31**
(1.95)
-0.081
(-0.55)
0.019
(0.19)
L2 0.053
(0.65)
0.1483**
(2.05)
0.230
(0.25)
-2.29**
(-2.25)
-0.883***
(-2.97)
-0.576***
(-2.72)
Exceptional
items
-0.072***
(-2.52)
0.0105
(0.44)
-0.032
(-0.17)
0.136
(0.60)
0.025
(0.92)
0.073***
(3.06)
L -0.075**
(2.06)
0.0177
(0.61)
0.372*
(1.28)
0.093
(0.33)
-0.054
(-0.88)
-0.117**
(2.19)
L2 0.181**
(1.70)
0.114*
(1.36)
0.633**
(2.02)
0.850***
(2.75)
-0.06**
(-2.19)
-0.012
(-0.55)
Interest paid -0.118
(0.76)
-0.110
(-1.02)
-1.328
(-0.77)
-0.746
(-0.67)
-0.268*
(-1.38)
-0.415***
(-3.89)
L 0.235
(1.15)
0.262
(1.07)
0.795
(0.31)
1.05
(0.81)
0.077
(0.36)
0.125
(0.70)
L2 -0.332*
(-1.57)
-0.199
(-1.11)
1.772
(1.01)
-2.51*
(-1.31)
-0.163
(-0.61)
0.253
(1.14)
Depreciation 0.363***
(3.24)
1.388
(1.22)
0.345***
(3.29)
L 0.241***
(2.76)
0.972
(0.78)
0.242**
(2.41)
L2 -0.014
(-0.10)
0.956
(0.80)
0.103
(0.45)
Employees
remuneration
-0.051
(-0.93)
0.0007
(0.01)
-0.111
(-0.63)
-0.257*
(-1.58)
-0.0228
(-0.44)
-0.094**
(-2.27)
L 0.303
(0.51)
.0589
(1.06)
0.026
(0.07)
-0.495**
(-2.01)
0.057
(0.48)
0.0425
(0.49)
L2 0.008
(0.23)
-0.14***
(-3.24)
-0.049
(-0.11)
0.476**
(1.98)
0.039
(0.56)
0.125***
(3.30)
Directors’
remuneration
-0.407
(-1.12)
-0.621**
(-2.29)
-0.676*
(-1.26)
-0.520
(-0.85)
0.480
(0.72)
0.7301**
(1.76)
5Sectors ⇒ Hotels and Restaurants Business Services
(computer consultancy)
Transport
(Manufacturing)
Explanatory
variables
Eq. (2) Eq. (3) Eq. (2) Eq. (3) Eq. (2) Eq. (3)
L -0.516
(-0.91)
-0.823*
(-1.39)
1.074*
(1.61)
1.410*
(1.60)
-0.893
(-1.03)
-2.73***
(5.17)
L2 1.311**
(2.12)
1.076***
(2.40)
0.254
(0.32)
0.357
(0.64)
-0.299
(-0.36)
-0.952*
(-1.30)
Constant -41501.42
(-0.57)
-1195.19
(-0.02)
78294.4
(0.65)
-146729.5*
(-1.46)
-63399.53
(-1.07)
-59256.63
(-0.96)
Observations 84 88 43 43 54 55
No. of
groups
46 47 28 28 30 30
Wald test Chi2 (42)=
18315.93
Chi2(36 )
=17129.1
Chi2 (40)=
10676.71
Chi2 (36 )=
9125.33
Chi2 (42)=
4738.71
Chi2 (36 )=
4485.44
Sargan test
of over-
identifying
restrictions
Chi2 (9)=
16.37
Pr>chi2 =
0.04
Chi2 (9)=
9.60
Pr>chi2=
0.38
Chi2 (8)=
1.96
Pr>chi2=
0.99
Chi2 (8)=
5.62
Pr>chi2=
0.78
Chi2 (9)=
9.40
Pr>chi2=
0.40
Chi2 (9)=
11.71
Pr>chi2=
0.23
Arellano-
Bond test of
no auto-
correlation
z=-1.33
Pr>z= 0.184
No autocorr.
in residuals
of order 1&2
z= -0.76
Pr>z= 0.44
No
autocorr. in
residuals of
order 1
z=-1.17
Pr>z= 0.24
No
autocorr. in
residuals of
order 1&2
z= -1.97
Pr>z= 0.05
No
autocorr. in
residuals of
order 1&2
z=-1.59
Pr>z=
0.1123
No
autocorr. in
residuals of
order 1&2
Z= -1.05
Pr>z= 0.29
No
autocorr. in
residuals of
order 1&2
*** statistically significant at 1 % level , **statistically significant at 5% level, *statistically significant at
10% level, ^ statistically significant at 10% level. L denotes one-period lag and L2 two-period lags.
